Comoros

Comoros has never participated in UN peacekeeping operations. The main reason relies on its turbulent internal political environment. The three Indian Ocean islands have experienced more than 20 coups or attempted coups, beginning just weeks after independence from France in 1975 when President Ahmed Abdallah was toppled in a coup assisted by French mercenary Colonel Bob Denard (BBC 2006k, par. 1).

Initial variables of the data collection process:

UN/UN peacekeeping policy reform
No record.

Perception of peacekeeping
No record.

Domestic political environment
Comorian politics has been very turbulent, with a range of administrations holding sway and 21 coups and counter-coups since independence in 1975 (EIU 2006j, 4).

The Union system is designed to overcome this by uniting Comoros in an overarching federation, while permitting the individual islands a degree of autonomy. Thus Grande Comore, Anjouan and Mohéli each have individual parliaments with varying numbers of seats, elected directly, while the Union presidency shifting between islands every four years. In 2006 this system passed its first major test with the peaceful transfer of power from Colonel Azali Assoumane representing the island of Grand Comore to Ahmed Abdallah Sambi, who represents the island of Anjouan. Power is due to shift again in 2010 to the smallest island, Mohéli. (Ibid.)

Comorian politics has long been characterized by a large number of political factions and parties, mainly based on community or personal loyalties (and to some extent on economic interests) rather than ideology (Ibid., 9).

This complicates the possibility of having Comoros as a troop contributor. And worse off, the army remains probably the prime political force in Comoros. Although its reputation was damaged by its earlier failure to reverse the secession of Anjouan, it filled a political vacuum when it seized power and has so far proved acceptable to ordinary Comorians. It has maintained law and order and, with the signing of the Fomboni accord, has helped to ease the separatist crisis. The African Union and South Africa have been involved in helping to stabilize the Comoros politically (Ibid., 10)

Domestic economic environment
Agriculture and trading are at the heart of the Comorian economy (Ibid., 16). However, “economic growth and development have been severely constrained by the country’s geographical isolation, the small size of the domestic market, the absence of minerals and most other high-value raw materials, and a shortage of fertile land” (Ibid.). Once Comoros is fully stabilized, it is possible that seek employment for its citizens as peacekeepers. Moreover, “sectors such as fishing and marine trade, which have made major contributions to other small coastal economies, have been neglected” (Ibid.).

The people of the Comoros are among the poorest in Africa and are heavily dependent on foreign aid (BBC 2006k, par. 7). Natural resources are in short supply and the islands' chief exports—vanilla, cloves and perfume essence—are prone to price fluctuations (Ibid.). Money sent home by Comorans living abroad is an important source of income (Ibid.).

Military affairs
The armed forces consist of a police force numbering 500 and a defence force of 500 members (EIU 2006bg, 5). France provides a small military presence, military training, and naval protection. Defence spending in 2001 was $6 million, or 3% of GDP (Ibid.).

Foreign policy
Relations with France are key (EIU 2006j, 10). Relations with France are central to foreign and economic policy, France was the most generous donor, pledging 65m (US$77.6m) over the 2006-09 period (Ibid.). Comoros has also drawn the attention of the US State Department in its global "war on terror" (Ibid., 11). The US administration is worried that, given the inherent instability and relative lawlessness of the islands, Comoros could become a haven for international terrorists (Ibid.). Thus, the USA might attempt to intensify its interest on Comoros.

In recent years Comorian foreign policy has sought to promote regional cooperation with Madagascar, Mauritius and Seychelles within the framework of the Indian Ocean Commission, and President Sambi has stated that he intends to foster such relations (Ibid.). But the cooperation agenda has no peacekeeping issues. Comoros is interested on having closer relations with the Arab world (Ibid.).

Perhaps unsurprisingly, given Sambis Islamic credentials, the new government has also made efforts to strengthen ties with the Arab world and other Islamic countries. None of those relations include peacekeeping cooperation. Sambi’s spokesman stated that in August 2006 the Sudanese president sent a delegation to the islands in what would be an attempt to strengthen "cultural and economic co-operation". Sambi also stressed the cultural linkages in a call to Libyan businesses to invest in the islands. In September 2006 the government also signed an agreement with a Dubai-based company to manage the ports at Moroni and Mustamudu. (Ibid.)

Additional variables found after the preliminary analysis:

Climate changes
No record.

Independent negotiations taken by DPKO to seek troops
No record.

Independent negotiations taken by contributor countries to engage non-contributor countries
No record.

Meetings organized by other international organizations to engage in dialogue about peacekeeping
No record.